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Creating Capitalism: Using Growth Models to Assess Transition 
 




Five generic reforms, price liberalization, property privatization, macroeconomic 
stabilization, microeconomic restructuring and trade liberalization, are integrated into both 
exogenous and endogenous growth models. This integration allows one to assess the implications 
of each reform for a representative consumer.  
If one assumes that in assessing a prospective reform each voter, given his unique 
characteristics and circumstances, acts as if he were the representative consumer, then this 
framework allows one to evaluate quantitatively the prospects of each reform for each distinct 
group. This model can be used to forecast how different voters, young-old, flexible-rigid, 
working-retired, taxpayer-transfer recipient, will respond to each proposal. This can in turn be 
used to determine the likelihood of success of a democratic polity in transition to capitalism.   
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Creating Capitalism: Using Growth Models to Assess Transition 
Frank C. Wykoff 
 
Western economists have identified five generic economic reforms that are necessary for former 
socialist states to adopt in order to transform their economies into private market economic 
systems.
1 Table I lists these reforms.  Much of the research on transition economies has dealt with 
various aspects of these five reforms,
2 with most of the emphasis on fiscal and monetary policies, 
exchange rate regimes and other monetary and financial issues.
3 Researchers have also focused 
on privatization methods adopted in different countries that have had significantly varying 
degrees of success.
4 Industry deregulation is often referred to in transition research as 
“restructuring.”
5 It means how the economies disentangle centralized organization and disengage 
central power from more microeconomic economic decision-making processes. Our focus here is 
on long-run consequences of reforms for the real economy rather than on financial issues.
6  
  Part of the reason that different countries have adopted reforms in varying degrees is that 
there has been considerable variance in the virulence of political resistance. In some countries 
voters through democratic processes have at times ejected reform governments in favor of parties 
of former communists.
7 In others, resistance has taken the form of subversion by insiders and of 
                                                            
1 Blanchard et al. (1992) and Lazear (1995) are two good examples.  
2 The burgeoning literature on this subject cannot be done justice here, but see Chavance (1994), Prust 
(1990), Wijnbergon (1992), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), Gotting (1993), Portes (1994), Hall and 
Koparanova (1995), Roemer (2000), Svejnar (1993) and Willett et al. (1995). 
3 See, for some examples, Oesterreichische Bank (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000), Bonin and Szekely 
(1992), Willett et al. (1995), Behrman and Srinivasan (1995), Hochreiter (2000), Kutan and Brada (2000), 
Lainela and Sutela (1995), Miller and Petrov (1992) and Nuti (1994). 
4 See Brady (1999), Boyco, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), Kortba (1993), Rondinelli (1994), Torok (1992), 
Vince (1993), Murrell and Wang (1993), Yamada and Braguinsky (1999). 
5 Hrncir (1992). 
6 See Brown and Earle (2000), Gustafson (1999) and Gylfason (1994). 
7 Bulgaria elected socialists (former communists) in July 1990 and in December 1994. Hungary elected 
former communists (MSZP) in June 1994. In May 1998 communists received 32 percent of the vote in 
Hungary. In the Russian Duma (the lower house of parliament that to some extent reflected popular 
sentiment), communists held pluralities in the elections of March 1993 and December 1995 with over 20 
percent of the vote. Slovakia split from the Czechs and was largely under the control of former communist 
leader Merciar from December 1994 until October 1998.    
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corruption and violence.
8 But what can explain the variance in the pace of reform and economic 
performance among countries? More importantly, does reform imply better performance? 
      Table 1.    Five generic economic reforms 
     1.     Price liberalization 
     2.    Property privatization 
     3.    Macroeconomic stabilization 
     4.    International trade liberalization 
     5.    Industry deregulation/restructuring 
 
  We pose some specific questions: (1) Can we explain why some countries adopt reforms 
faster and more completely than others? (2) Can we show why these reforms matter—what 
exactly do they accomplish? (3) Do reforms actually lead to higher living standards? (3) As these 
countries evolve simultaneously toward democracy and markets, how do political choices about 
reforms interact with voting behavior?  
  To answer these types of questions we develop a set of models that links improvements 
in consumer well being to reforms. We then tie voting behavior to prospects for improved well 
being. Next we establish dual-direction linkages between economic performance and the politics 
of reforms. Elections are central to the linkage. We begin the process by linking the five generic 
economic reforms to models of economic growth. We subsequently link the reform-growth 
framework to voting behavior. We then design an econometric model and test the models with 
evidence from six countries. 
  Here we begin with a simple corn economy that at each moment in time produces one 
homogenous output (corn) Yt with two inputs, labor Nt and capital (corn) Kt. Capital depreciates 
                                                            
8 Russia is of course the most prominent case of criminal conduct in economic affairs, but other transition 
economies were not immune. See Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (1999), Brady (1999), Gaddy and Ickes 
(1998), Gustafson (1999) and Frye and Shleifer (1997). See also Wissels (1996), Winiecki (1989, 1990) 
Murrell and Wang (1993), Brainerd (1998) and Yamada and Braguinsky (1999).  
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(corn rots) at constant rate δ.
9 Harrod neutral technological change, At, falls to earth like "manna 
from heaven"
10 at the fixed exogenous rate γ. We assume formation of human capital occurs at a 
constant geometric rate that depends on two parameters: the proportion of time spent in education 
or skill development, ϕ, and on the “efficiency” of education, µ, as measured by its impact on 
labor productivity.
11 Output may either be consumed (eaten), Ct, or saved and invested (as seed 
corn) for additions to the stock of capital (corn plants), It. 
  We assume that private individuals acting in a competitive environment make all 
production and consumption decisions. In section 1, we develop this growth model in three 
stages. First, we develop a Solow production function with the above features and derive the 
solution system with exogenously determined savings at rate s. Second, we develop consumer 
behavior; and third, we develop producer behavior. We show how price liberalization and 
property privatization operate directly through parameters of this model. 
  In section 2 we introduce a government’s budget, beginning with a balanced budget 
model. Revenues derive from head taxes Xt. Government expenditures contain two items:  
defense spending (corn given to potential enemies as bribes for good behavior), Gt, and transfer 
payments (corn simply re-allocated among persons), Qt. Net head taxes are Tt ≡ Xt – Qt. We next 
allow a richer fiscal policy, taxes on capital income at rate z. We allude briefly to deficit 
spending. Government in the model provides new parameters through which macroeconomic 
stabilization and industry deregulation (restructuring) influence living standards. 
                                                            
9 This model follows the famous Solow (1956, 1970) model, which has formed the basis of growth analysis 
for over forty years. 
10 If new technology augments the labor input, it is called Harrod neutral technological change. We discuss 
below alternative models of technological change which include Hicks neutral, capital augmenting and 
labor and capital embodied. 
11'Jones (1998) suggests that development of human capital may be the transmission 
mechanism through which free trade assists in the transfer of technology from advanced 
to developing economies. The idea of human capital is used extensively by Becker (1964, 
1993).  
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  In section 3, we introduce endogenous technological change.
12 This allows us to model 
the causes of technological change, At. Endogenous technological change models either assume 
that new capital spawns externalities or assume that scale economies characterize new 
technology. Assuming scale economies, a noncompetitive (possibly patent-protected) sector uses 
labor input as researchers to produce new "ideas" or "designs" or, in the corn economy, 
genetically improved strains of corn. Thus, the rate of technological change will depend on three 
parameters, the rate of discovery, θ; the effect of existing knowledge A on the discovery rate, φ; 
and the elasticity of discoveries by researchers, ε. 
  In section 4 we open the economy so that trade can transfer technology from advanced 
societies where it is most likely to occur to transition economies. We assume technology is 
transferred through trade at rate κ to transition economies. This model provides a channel for free 
trade reform to influence living standards in transition. 
The corn economy 
From growth models one can determine paths over time for the flows of income, consumption 
expenditures, saving and the rate of capital accumulation. The steady state conditions will be 
shown to depend upon the values of certain parameters:  initial conditions, consumer tastes, the 
technology of production, savings rates, population growth, capital replacement rates, and relative 
costs of capital and labor inputs.  
  Growth models traditionally are employed in cross-country studies in two ways. First, the 
models explain why different economies have different steady states. We show how reforms 
improve the steady state by altering specific steady-state conditions. Second, "transition dynam-
ics" are used to explore the evolution of a transition economy toward a new reform-induced 
steady state. We suggest a third application of growth models, as inputs into the decision-making 
                                                            
12This material is based on Jones (1998) as well as on earlier sources.  
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process of voters in elections.
13 We use the model to predict how people will vote when offered 
choices between various degrees of reform by different political parties or candidates in an 
election.  
  Specifically, we assume that each citizen views herself as the representative consumer in 
a growth model. She plugs the effects of each choice (implicitly or explicitly associated with each 
candidate or party) into her growth model, which is defined by the model that reflects her unique 
characteristics and tastes (which we develop more fully below). She then votes for the candidate 
whose policies regarding reforms make her better off in the calculus of her optimization problem. 
This integration of growth and political modeling formalizes the notion that voters act like 
economic agents, they are forward-looking, self-interested optimizers. 
  The steady state is determined and described first, then we will see how certain parameter 
changes cause the steady state to change, leading to a different path or outcome. This model 
informs how we integrate economic performance, reform measures and political outcome data for 
subsequent econometric analysis. 
Production 
Let Yt, Kt, and Nt, be the time t quantities of output, capital, and labor respectively. We assume 
that the labor force grows at the constant rate η: 
(1) Nt = N0e
ηt. 
N0 >0 is the initial quantity of labor. The labor input is augmented by technological change and 
evolves over time as a result of the evolution of human capital. First, consider technological 
change. Let At be the level of technological change at time t and define Et ≡ AtNt. We have 
assumed the A t grows at rate γ. Thus, At = A0e
γt. Combining this with (1), Et = A0e
γtN0e
ηt. Et is 
                                                            
13 Hall and Jones (1997), Jones (1998), Gylfason (1994), Easterly and Levine (1997) all suggest that institu-
tions are key to explaining why some economies are less successful than others. We take this one step 
farther by linking specific economic reforms to voting behavior, which is in turn linked to growth. This 
helps to bridge the gap between growth theory and public choice analysis.  
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the quantity of labor input at time t measured in efficiency units.
14 Now consider development of 
human capital. Let Ht ≡ e
ϕµEt where ϕ is time spent in skill development and education and µ is 
the impact of this learning on labor productivity. Notice that human capital acquisition does not 
depend on time per se. Combining human capital and efficiency improvements from technology, 
we have 




The Solow aggregate production function in Cobb-Douglas form is
15 
(3) Yt = Kt
αHt
β. 
  We assume that production is increasing in both arguments, and that marginal products 
are declining.
16 Both α and β are positive, constant, and less than one. Taking natural logs and 
partial derivatives of (3) shows that α and β are the respective output elasticities of the inputs. 
In the corn economy Yt is either consumed, Ct, or invested, It. Given δ, gross investment equals 
the sum of net new investment (growth in capital at time t) and replacement requirements, δKt; 
thus, the growth path of capital obeys the differential equation 
(4) K•t = It - δKt 
where K•t ≡ dKt/dt. If we assume constant returns to scale, then α+β= 1, and if yht ≡ Yt/Ht and kht 
≡ Kt/Ht, equation (3) may be rewritten as 
 (3’)  yht = kht
α. 
  Taking natural log derivatives of the definition of kht we have k•ht/knt = K•t/Kt – H•t/Ht.  
Under constant returns to scale with constant growth of labor, the choice variable is the level of 
capital per Ht, kht. All the analysis is now done only in terms of equation (3’), i.e., in units of 
                                                            
14 Suppose, for instance, we start with 100 efficiency units of labor at time t. Let the number of workers 
increase by 1 percent and technology augments the efficiency of all workers (not just the new ones) at a .05 
percent rate. Then E at time t+1 is 101.05. 
15We begin here the practice of presenting only the Cobb-Douglas version of the models. In general all 
results that we exploit hold for the general case in which production satisfies constant returns to scale and 
diminishing marginal product of inputs.  
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output per worker measured in efficiency units of an effective human. Efficiency of an effective 
human allows both for technological change at rate γ and for evolution of human capital at rate 
ϕµ.  Once the quantities of capital and output per efficiency unit of an effective human are de-
termined, these same ratios will hold for all scale levels. Using the time path of capital, equation 
(4), we have 
(5) k•ht = iht - (γ + η + δ)kht 
where iht ≡ It/Ht. If consumption is proportional to income (output) with marginal propensity to 
save of s,
17 then 
(5’) k•ht = skht
α - (γ + η + δ)kht. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the situation. The top curve depicts equation (3’); output per 
efficiency unit of an effective human increases with capital per efficiency unit of an effective 
human at a declining rate (positive diminishing marginal product). The lower curve is the fraction 
of output per efficiency unit of an effective human not consumed, syht, and thus invested, syht = 
iht.  
  The ray from the origin is the sum of the growth rate of labor-augmenting technological 
change, labor growth rate and replacement requirements, (γ+η+δ)kht. Consider points kh1 and kh2. 
At kh1 investment exceeds the sum of the growth rate of technology, population and the rate of 
replacement requirements. At kh1, then, K/H is increasing (the economy is in disequilibrium); it is 
moving toward kh* from the left. At kh2, the rate of capital formation is less than capital 
replacement plus population growth plus technological change so that capital per efficiency unit 
of an effective human is falling - the economy is moving toward kh* from the right. Only at kh* 
does gross investment exactly offset the per-efficiency human capital requirements needed to 
accommodate growth in technology plus population plus capital depreciation, so that capital per 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 This means that ∂Y/∂K>0, ∂Y/∂N>0, ∂
2Y/∂K
2 <0, and ∂
2Y/∂N
2 <0. In the Cobb-Douglas case 0<α<1 and 
0<β<1. Below we add the assumption that α+β=l, constant returns to scale. 
17 We allow the consumer to choose s later; for now it is not necessary.  
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efficiency unit of an effective human is constant. Thus, at kht* the economy satisfies the steady 
state condition that k•ht = 0. 
Figure 1 The corn economy 
K/H and Y/H are constant: 
syht = (γ + η + δ)kht. 
   y ht 
                         yht*                                                                          yht = kht
α
     
                                                                                                               (γ+η+δ)kht 
  
                                                                                                               skht 
α 
                                                                                                  
 
                                                kh1                      kh*             kh2 k ht  
                          
Imposing the steady state condition, kh•t = 0, on equation (5’), the capital-output ratio is 
 (6)  kht/yht = s/(γ+η+δ). 
The capital-output ratio is a constant determined by the savings rate and the rates of technological 
change, population growth and replacement requirements. In the Cobb-Douglas case, steady state 
k and y are 
 (6’)  kh* = [s/(γ+η+δ)]
1/(1-α)   yh* = [s/(γ+η+δ)]
α/(1-α). 
  This model with a constant savings rate reveals important economic forces that determine 
different living standards in different countries.
18 If the savings rate (in the sense of the proportion 
of output devoted to productive capital), s, is high, then living standards will be high. Low 
savings rates could reflect extreme poverty or institutions, customs, and policies that discourage  
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acquisitiveness. Ceteris paribus, rapid population growth, η, or high replacement requirements, δ, 
imply lower living standards. Rapid population growth could reflect institutions, customs and 
policies that encourage large families or rapid reproduction rates and longer life spans, and high 
replacement requirements could reflect shoddy production methods. However, because (6’) 
indicates growth of capital and output per efficiency unit of labor, an increase in the rate of labor-
augmenting technological change will cause growth in output per worker. Also, increases in the 
formation of human capital e
ϕµ will raise output per worker. Finally, as α, the output elasticity of 
capital, converges on one, α→1, living standards rise for each level of capital per worker. 
The consumer 
We now drop the assumption of an exogenous savings rate, and model consumer behavior. 
Assume the representative consumer is forward looking, self-interested, and infinitely lived.
19 
Utility, u, at each moment in time depends only on consumption at that time, cht.
20 The present 
value of the consumer's future stream of utility is the continuous weighted sum of utility received 
at each moment in the future. Since she is evaluating future utility from today's perspective, she 
may choose to discount future consumption relative to current consumption. Let ρ be her 
subjective discount rate.
21 At time zero, utility U0 is the present value of the discounted sum of 
the future stream of utility; each future moment's consumption is discounted by subjective rate ρ: 
(7) U0 = t=0∫ 
t=∞ u(cht)e
-ρtdt. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 We use the phrase "living standards" loosely here to refer to output per worker. In growth models, popu-
lation and labor force growth are assumed to be the same. 
19 Since N is growing over time at rate η, we can think of the representative consumer as a family. 
20 We maintain the assumption of constant returns to scale and measure all quantity variables in units per 
efficiency unit of an effective human: ch ≡ C/H. The consumer maximizes ch. Recall that H ≡ e
ϕµEN where 
E represents Harrod neutral technological change and e
ϕµ is human capital. One could assume that the 
consumer maximizes utility from consumption per family member, not per efficiency unit of an effective 
human; however, this results in an unreasonable result: consumption does not grow as a result of new 
technology, because the consumer discounts utility to offset future gains from technological change. This 
may be the case, but it suggests current generations can anticipate the rate of technological change. 
21 In Aesop's fable the cricket played all summer while the ant worked. Crickets have high values for ρ and 
ants have low values, perhaps even zero, for ρ.  
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If ρ is zero, then she does not prefer consumption now relative to consumption in the future.
22 
The consumer receives income, yht, from two sources - labor (measured in efficiency units of 
effective humans) supplied inelastically earns wage wt, and the capital stock, kht, which she owns, 
yields gross return vt per unit.
23 The consumer selects the consumption-savings path that 
maximizes utility, subject to her income stream. She may either consume income or save it; thus 
income not consumed is saved and, therefore, available for investment, iht: 
 (8)  wt + vtkht = yht = cht + sht = cht + iht. 
The sources of income, wt + vtkht, equal the uses of income, cht + iht. 
  To solve the consumer optimization problem, we augment the time-t utility function to 
allow for the budget constraint. We introduce the budget constraint as imposed by the rate of 
growth of capital. The augmented optimization function, the Hamiltonian, is
24 
(9) Ht = u(cht)e
-ρt + λt{yht -[cht + (γ+η+δ)kht]}. 
The variable λt, the costate variable, is the value at t=0 of a time-t increment to capital. The op-
timum requires that the Hamiltonian satisfy three conditions:
25 
                                                            
22 As with the production function, we will consider special cases of utility functions. At this time, though,  
this detail is not elucidating. An obvious candidate is the Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to 
scale: 
 u(cht) = cht
ξ. 
Unfortunately, with only one argument in the utility function, constant returns to scale restricts ξ =1. The 
Cobb-Douglas form forces the elasticity of substitution parameter to one. A more general form is the 
constant elasticity of substitution form: 
 (ctht
 1-ξ - 1)/1-ξ for  ξ > 0 and  ξ  # 1 
u(cht) = { 
                               In cht,  for   ξ = 1. 
Here, the substitution, σ = -ξ
-1, is constant Other specific functional forms have been employed in growth 
modeling, including quadratic and log linear. In general, σ is not constant and depends on cht. With 
technological change the parameters of the utility function will enter into the steady state condition. 
23 The consumer is taking input prices as given. The steady state values for these terms will only be known 
after optimizing by the producer and the consumer. 
24 Here we follow Blanchard and Fischer (1989). See also Intriligator (1971). 
25 Condition (i) yields λt = u’(c)e
-ρt where u’ ≡ du(cht)/dcht. Solving this expression for λ•t, the left-hand 
side of condition (ii) is 
  λ•t = [u”(cht)c•ht - ρu’(cht)]e
-ρt. 
If we assume the simple Cobb-Douglas technology then the right-hand side of condition (ii) is 
 - Hk =λt [(γ+η+δ) - αkht
(α-1))] 
Equating the two sides of condition (ii) yields 
[u"(cht)c•ht – ρu'(cht)] e
-ρt = λt[(γ+η+δ) - αkht
(α-1)]. Using (i) to remove λt, we have equation (A.10).  
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(i)  ∂H/∂c = 0 
(ii)  λ•t = -∂H/∂k 
(iii) limt→∞ktλt = 0. 
Imposing (i) and (ii) for utility maximization yields the Euler condition: 
(10) [chtu”/u’] [c•ht/cht]= ρ + γ + δ + η - (∂y ht /∂kht). 
The first term in square brackets geometrically represents the degree of curvature of the utility 
function that reflects the degree of flexibility of consumer tastes in shifting consumption over 
time. As a consumer's tastes in terms of indifference between consumption over different periods 
become more rigid, u”→ ∞. Right-angle Leontief indifference curves illustrate the extreme 
version of this case.
26 As a consumer's tastes become more flexible in terms of preferences for 
consumption among periods, u”→ 0 and the indifference curves become flatter, approaching 
linearity.  
  If we assume constant elasticity of substitution form among consumption between 
periods, then [-u'/cu"] ≡ σ; where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
27 In this case, 
(10) becomes 
(10’) c•ht/cht = σ{[∂y ht /∂kht  - (η + δ)] –[γ + ρ]}. 
The Euler condition for the steady state suggests an intuitive explanation of the forward-looking 
consumer's optimal policy behavior.  
  This rule governs the optimal time path of consumption and depends on four concepts:  
the intertemporal rate of substitution (flexibility of tastes), σ; the subjective discount rate (degree 
of patience), ρ; the rate of technological change, γ; and the term in the first set of square brackets 
on the right had side of (10’). As with any elasticity concept, σ ranges from zero to infinity. If σ = 
0 then the consumer is unwilling to substitute consumption between periods and c•ht = 0. If 
                                                            
26 A Leontief utility function illustrates the extreme case: u(c1 + c2) = Min [c1, c2]. 
27 See note 373. The CES function satisfies this condition.  
  13 
0<σ<1 then she has an inelastic rate of substitution between periods—she is reluctant to 
substitute one period’s utility for another—she is comparatively inflexible. If σ =1, her 
intertemporal elasticity is unitary and she will substitute between periods if conditions warrant it. 
As u”→ 0, σ→∞ and she is becoming more flexible between consumption at different times.  
  The term in the first set of square brackets on the right-hand side of (10') is the net 
marginal product of an increment of capital, i.e., the net increment is the marginal product of 
capital minus replacement requirements for depreciation and population growth.
28 For σ ≠ 0, 
consumption per efficiency unit of an effective human will grow over time when this net 
marginal product of capital exceeds the sum of ρ, the consumer's rate of time preference, and γ, 
the rate of technological change. If, however, the net marginal product of capital is less than the 
rate of time preference plus the rate of technological change, then consumption per efficiency unit 
of an effective human will be declining over time. 
  Thus, the savings-consumption choice that determines how much current output the 
consumer is willing to put aside for capital formation depends on σ, ρ, ∂y/∂k, η, δ, and γ. Ceteris 
paribus, flexible consumers (easygoing people with high σ) will be more willing to substitute 
consumption between periods in order to accommodate capital acquisition. ρ reflects the 
consumer's degree of impatience; impatient grasshoppers have a large ρ, so that ceteris paribus 
their savings rate is low. Farsighted ants have small ρ, so that ceteris paribus they will save more. 
A large value for η or δ discourages savings, because more of the gross marginal product of 
capital has to compensate for population growth or for more rapid depreciation. These forces can 
each reduce the net benefits from sacrificing consumption now. 
  Assuming that the parameters σ and ρ are fixed when the consumer is optimizing reflects 
the idea that historical, social, political, and economic forces have already determined tastes. 
                                                            
28 Since the consumer is optimizing consumption per efficiency unit of human capital the rate of 
technological change enters into the Euler condition.  
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These historical forces influence behavior even of forward-looking consumers. This serves as a 
proof that initial conditions in transition economies will influence growth patterns. It furthermore 
indicates precisely how initial conditions enter the optimization calculus. This allows us to 
identify behavior of various different economic agents. 
  Older, inflexible and impatient consumers and myopic, carefree grasshoppers will have a 
low value of σ and a high value for ρ. They will resist policies with short-run costs and 
long-range benefits. Young, flexible consumers and industrious ants with foresight will have 
large σ and low ρ and will tolerate current sacrifice for future consumption.
29 Finally, if the 
marginal product of capital net of population growth and depreciation is large relative to the 
subjective discount rate, then the person will forgo current consumption for future gains from 
capital formation. This means that economic efficiency, population growth and the quality of 
capital goods will also influence the proportion of output devoted to savings and investment. 
The rate of technological change enhances the growth rate of per-person consumption growth, 
because ct = chte
( ϕµ + γt). Thus, ct grows over time at rate γ faster than cht.  
The producer 
The producer maximizes profits subject to input prices and the constraints of contemporary 
technology. Given exogenous labor growth η, exogenous evolution of human capital e
ϕµ and 
exogenous technological change γ, the choice variable for the producer is the amount of capital 
per efficiency unit of an effective human, kht. Once this is determined for a steady state, the 
marginal product of capital, ∂y ht /∂kht, will be locked in and we can solve (10’) for consumption 
and saving. 
                                                            
29 This is not to say that all young consumers are flexible and all old consumers are inflexible. These are 
illustrative extreme examples.  
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  The gross return on one unit of capital, vt, is the sum of rt, the net return on capital, and δ, 
the rate of depreciation.
30 The time path of capital can be derived by employing the fact that sht = 
yht - cht. The growth rate of capital per efficiency unit of an effective human equals income minus 
the sum of consumption expenditures and the amount of new investment goods needed to 
accommodate labor force growth and improvements in worker efficiency (via technological 
change) and to replace depreciated capital: 
(11) k•ht = sht - (γ+η+δ)kht = yht - [cht + (γ+η+δ)kht]. 
Equation (11) is the time path of capital condition. Consumer behavior is more complicated now 
so this equation is actually more complex than it may appear. Now consumption and therefore 
saving depends on utility maximization rather than being determined exogenously. 
  The producer maximizes the present value of his future profit stream. Profit at time t is 
output minus current labor and capital costs. Product price is normalized to one. In present value 
terms, profits are discounted from the future to the present at the net rate of return on capital, r: 
 (12)  Πt = t=0∫ 
t=∞ [kht
α - (wt + vtkht)]e
-rtdt. 
The producer selects the quantity of capital that maximizes profit, yielding 
 (13)  ∂yht/∂kht =  αkht
α-1 = vt = rt + δ.  
Thus, the producer's optimal decision rule is to set the marginal product of capital equal to the 
gross user-cost of capital at each moment in time.
31 This condition is called the marginal product 
of capital condition. Under constant returns to scale, the residual after payments to capital is equal 
to wage income. (Recall that one unit of labor is measured by an efficiency unit of an effective 
human): 
 w t = (1-α)kht
α. 
                                                            
30 The relationship between capital prices, say qt, and the service prices vt, rate of return r and depreciation 
δ may be derived from the dual to the producer optimization problem; see Hulten (1992). 
31 The last equality is for the constant returns Cobb-Douglas case.  
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At the steady state, both inputs are paid the value of their marginal product; and under constant 
returns to scale, final product is exhausted by these payments.
32 The consumer's income is  
 y ht = w t + vkht. 
  This completes our derivation of the three steady state conditions:
33 The Euler condition 
for optimal consumption (10), the time path of capital (11), and the marginal product of capital 
(13). The conditions depend upon the parameters σ, ρ, δ, η, γ, α, and on factor prices w and r. 
The modified golden rule 
We can solve the steady state for the per-worker values of capital, output, consumption and 
utility. Let y*, c*, k* and u* be steady state values for per-worker income, consumption, capital 
and utility. We begin with the Euler condition, (10’). At the steady state c•t = 0 so that 
(14) yk ≡ ∂yht/∂kht = αkht
α-1 = αyh*/kh* =  ρ + γ + η + δ        for σ>0. 
The steady state marginal product of capital equals the sum of four terms, the subjective discount 
rate, the rate of technological change, the growth rate of labor and the rate of replacement. The 
capital-output ratio under constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology is the constant α/(ρ + γ + η 
+ δ). The firm hires capital up to the point at which the marginal product equals the gross cost of 
capital, v. Thus, from equation (14), r+δ = ρ+γ+η+δ. The net rate of return on capital, r, in the 
steady state is determined by the sum of the rate of time preference, ρ, the rate of technological 
change, γ, and the rate of labor force growth, η. 
  The marginal product condition for capital (14) may be solved for the quantity of capital 
at the steady state, kh*.
34 The optimization problem brings ρ into the solution system. Higher 
discount rates usually lead to smaller steady state capital stocks, because ρ>0 indicates that 
                                                            
32 In the Cobb-Douglas case with constant returns, w + vk = (1-α)k
α + αk
α-1k = 1. 
33 Blanchard and Fischer (1989) show that an additional condition in this type of problem, called the 
transversality condition, must also be satisfied to prevent a solution that explodes and in which consumers 
could always accumulate capital without lack of benefits. This condition is satisfied by our system: 
 limt→∞ktu’(cht)e
-ρt = 0. 
This condition rules out Ponzi-scheme financing.  
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consumers are less willing to sacrifice current consumption for accumulation and capital 
formation. In the Cobb-Douglas case, 
(15)     kh* = [α/(ρ + γ + η + δ)]
1/1-α 
   yh* = kh*
α  
  ch* = yh* - ( γ + η + δ) kh* 
  u* = u(ct*). 




(γ+η)t so that the growth rate of income exceeds the 
growth rate of income per effective unit of human capital by η + γ. Thus per capita income is 
growing at the steady state at rate γ. Furthermore per capita income is increased at the steady state 
by higher human capital, e
ϕµ. Recall also that ct* = cht*e
ϕµA0e
γt and that u[cht*], so that at the 
steady state when c•ht = 0, consumption per person will be higher by the level of human capital 
and rising at the rate of technological change, γ. The second equation in (15) follows directly 
from the production function, yh = k h
α. In general, the steady state capital output ratio, kh*/yh*, 
will be constant. At the steady state, kh* is constant. Thus, from equation (11), ih* = (γ+η+δ)kh* 
and savings equals investment, and so the third equality in (15) follows; namely, consumption ch* 
is yh* minus (γ+η+δ)kh*. Steady-state utility simply depends on cht*, given the functional form of 
utility. 
  If we set the derivative of cht* with respect to kh* to zero, we have the maximum steady 
state value of consumption, cht
 m. The consumer maximizes consumption when the marginal prod-
uct of capital, yk, equals γ+δ+η. However, by equation (14), the steady-state marginal product of 
capital equals ρ+γ+δ+η; thus, socially optimal consumption, c
g, will be less than c
m by ρ. Intui-
tively, this means that if consumers discount future utility then they will maximize utility at a 
lower c*. Condition (14) modifies the golden rule, the famous rule for long-run maximization of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 This solution follows from the assumption of diminishing marginal product, because in this case f’ is a 
monotonically decreasing function of k. Since y is increasing in k, we can also solve for y.  
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consumption modified because the steady state increment of output from capital must cover the 
subjective discounted rate ρ as well as γ+η+δ. The marginal product of capital is larger at the 
modified golden rule if ρ>0, so the modified golden rule level of capital and income are also less 






m) where mg represents the modified golden 
rule and m the maximum consumption levels.
35  
Figure 2 illustrates the modified golden rule. The steady state occurs where the slope of 
the ray ρ +γ + η + δ is the same as the slope of the tangent to the production function. This point 
determines k* and y*. For ρ>0, this ray is steeper than the replacement requirements for capital 
per efficiency unit of an effective human. This result in turn implies that k* is lower than it would 
be in the case of the golden rule. Large discount rates mean that crickets are unwilling to sacrifice 
current consumption for capital accumulation and higher c* at the steady state. 
Figure 2 The modified golden rule with ρ>γ 
      y                   MPk,m     y=f(k)   
                ym       
 
       ( ρ+γ+η+δ)k 
        ( γ+η+δ)k 
            k m k g    k    
 
 
Reforms 1 and 2: Price liberalization and property privatization 
With this model we can show how two of the generic economic reforms influence the long-run 
growth path. Price liberalization essentially replaces a system of administered prices with a 
                                                            
35 Blanchard and Fischer (1989) show that such a steady state is stable. All points in (c, k) space are 
characterized by pressures moving the economy toward a saddle path that leads to the modified golden rule 
steady state.  
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system in which prices are market determined. Thus prices now reflect consumer sovereignty. 
This means in turn that the mix of consumer goods will improve from the point of view of the 
consumer. Econometric interpretation of the formal model requires that the consumer good, ct, be 
represented by an index of consumer goods. Thus, we model price liberalization as an increase in 
utility associated with each level of consumption: 
  u(ct) > u(ct)  ∀ ct, 
where u is the new, post price liberalization utility function.
36 Price liberalization also applies to 
the prices of factor inputs so that the rate of return on capital, r, will rise too. One would also 
expect proper relative capital prices to lead to a lower depreciation rate δ in that those paying the 
appropriate price for capital would acquire less shoddy capital.  
  Property privatization also influences the steady state. The essence of property 
privatization is to foster improved production methods by creating private individuals as residual 
claimants of profits.
37 This reform has several important consequences on the steady state as 
represented by the solutions in equation (15). Private property owners are likely to develop better 
production methods. In our model this means an improvement in f(kht). This could be viewed as 
an upward shift in the production curve in Figure A.2. This is like a one shot increase in Hicks 
neutral technological change: 
y ht = a tf(kht)    
 where  at is growing at an exponential rate and represents the shift that results from a 
Hicks neutral technological change shock.  Since the production process itself may improve, we 
represent the new, post property privatization production technology as f, assuming f(kht)>f(kht) 
for all kht. In the model with Harrod neutral technological change developed above, privatization 
                                                            
36 Since utility here is ordinal, this is simply a rescaling, but the fact is that a better mix of consumer goods 
implies a happier consumer. 
37 Intertemporal optimization implies that accumulated capital lasts over time. To induce private agents to 
acquire such capital requires some degree of certainty that ownership rights will not be eradicated by 
nationalization. The wide political swings from promarket reform regimes to socialist (former communist) 
regimes certainly causes concern for potential investors, especially foreign investors.   
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has a sustained effect by increasing the rate of technological change, γ.  Since property 
privatization improves production, it also reduces the rate of depreciation: δ δ δ δ < δ where δ δ δ δ is the 
new depreciation rate. In terms of Figure A.2, slower depreciation means lower replacement 
requirements which rotates the rays from the origin downward, thus raising the steady state 
capital/income pair.  
Third, property privatization, by creating private residual claimants, will foster 
acquisitive behavior. More acquisitive people are ceteris paribus more thrifty. Thus, ρ should be 
reduced and steady state savings s* increased: 
 ρ ρ ρ ρ < ρ, s* > s*. 
The model with a specific functional form provides more insight into the growth consequences of 
property privatization. The utility function enters into the steady state in this model through two 
symbols, ρ and σ. As noted above, property privatization is likely to lower ρ because residual 
claimants are more foresighted. Private property owners are likely to more flexible and involved 
in their economic choices as well so we would expect σ to rise.  
  The human capital aspects of the models provide two new channels through which 
property privatization can raise the steady state. By fostering acquisitiveness, private property 
also encourages human capital acquisition via more education (ϕ rises) and via the transmission 
of this improved knowledge to production (µ rises). We turn now to vehicles through which 
macroeconomic stabilization reforms can enhance growth. 
2. The public fisc and private budgets 
Assume the government spends amount Gt on goods and services. The government also spends Qt 
on transfer payments such as retirement benefits, welfare payments, veterans' benefits and other 
social spending. These outlays are financed in part by either direct taxes on the consumer, Xt, or 
taxes on capital income, vtKt, at rate z. We can simplify the derivations by defining all 
government budget magnitudes in the same units as output, capital and consumption; namely,  
  21 
amounts per efficiency-unit of effective human capital. Defining gt ≡ Gt/Nt and ght ≡ Gt/Ht, recall 
the definition of H as 
 (16)  Ht ≡ e
ϕµAtNt. 
Therefore, gt = ghte
ϕµAt and  g•t/gt = g•ht/ght + γ. 
  These results show that growth of government spending per capita will exceed growth of 
government spending per efficiency unit of effective human capital by the rate of technological 
change γ. These formulations illustrate the point that once we solve the system in H units, we can 
employ (16) to solve for per capita values.  
  Defining net taxes to be head taxes net of transfers, τ ht ≡ xht - qht, then a balanced budget 
policy implies that ght = τht + zvtk ht. If ght > τht + zvkht then the government issues bonds, b•ht. The 
public, indifferent between holding bonds and capital, purchases the bonds. The government must 
pay the competitive bond rate r the same net rate of return as capital.   Table 2 summarizes the 
growth model with human capital, exogenous technological change and a government budget. 
Consequences of fiscal policy 
Fiscal policies affect the private sector through the consumer's budget constraint and the 
producer's cost of capital. The after-tax cost of capital becomes (1- z)vt = r + δ. This means that 
the productivity of the private capital stock must not only cover a return to the owner of capital, 
but also the proportion of tax revenues paid out of capital income. 
  Recall that the consumer's income derives from her ownership of the means of production 
as well as from her wage income. Her budget constraint is changed in two ways by taxes. First, 
she must pay τht taxes net of transfers (she will be a net recipient if transfers exceed head taxes). 
Second, her income (say, in the form of dividend income) from capital is based on the after-tax 
cost of capital.  
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Table 2. Growth model assumptions 
      
 __________________________________________________________ 
    1. Technology:  Labor growth rate η  
production linear homogeneous α+β=1 
capital depreciation rate δ  
diminishing marginal product yk = (α-1)αkht
α-2 < 0 
harrod neutral technological change rate γ 
human capital from education e
ϕµ 
⇒ growth rate rule of capital per human efficiency unit or 
     k •ht = iht – (γ + η + δ) kht 
    
 ___________________________________________________________ 
2. Producer :  rational, self-interested, forward looking 
    price taker w, r 
    pays capital tax rate z 
          labor (H) supply elasticity = 0 




      chooses  quantity  of  capital  kht 
  maximizes  profit 
⇒ max  present discounted value (PDV) of output minus costs or 
Max ∫ [kht
α  - {wt + [(r+δ)/(l -z)]kht}]e
–rtdt 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
3. Consumer:   rational, self-interested, forward looking 
        utility  additive  over  time  U0 = t∫ ut dt  
      utility  depends  on  consumption  per  human  u(cht) 
      (efficiency  unit  of  an  effective  human) 
       maximizes  PDV  of  utility 
      owns  capital  stock    kht 
 





       ⇒ max PDV of future utility stream (subject to the budget constraint) or 
max ∫ U(cht)e
-ρtdt subject to  yht- τht = wt + (1-z)vtkht   
 _____________________________________________________________ 
4. Government:   spends on goods and services ght 
      transfers  payments  qht 
      collects  head  taxes  xht 
      net  head  taxes  are  τht 
      taxes  capital  income  rate  z 
    finances deficits by issuing bonds bt 
⇒ sources and uses of GDP  
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Balanced budget 
If the government balances its budget, then ght = τht + zvtkht; and b•ht = 0, then sht = iht, private 
uses of income (consumption plus investment) equal private sources of income (wage income 
plus after tax-capital income minus taxes net of transfers): 
(17) cht + iht = wht + ( 1 - z)vtkht - τht. 
The new time path of capital is 
(18) k•ht = yht - ght - [cht + (γ + δ + η)kht].  
We assume that government expenditures do not alter marginal utility, so the consumer 
maximizes the same subjectively discounted future utility stream subject to the new budget 
constraint.
38 The new Hamiltonian is 
(19) Ht = u(ct) e
-ρt + λt{yht - ght - [cht + (γ + η +δ)kht]}. 
  The tax on capital income alters private market performance. The gross cost of capital, v, 
now equals (r+δ)/(1-z); i.e., v is deflated by one minus the marginal tax rate on capital income. 
Thus, the cost of capital is higher since it has to yield taxes before the producer can earn capital 
income. Given diminishing marginal product, this implies a smaller equilibrium capital stock. 
Wage income is the residual from total earnings minus gross income earned by capital. As above, 
this result follows from constant returns to scale technology. Recall that if each factor is paid the 
value of its marginal product, then all income is exhausted.
39 
More demands are placed on aggregate income now that the government uses a portion of 
output. Income, yht, must now accommodate government spending, ght, as well as private con-
sumption and investment for replacement, labor force growth, and Harrod neutral technological 
                                                            
38It is important to note that g may enter the utility function, and consumers may be willing to accept lower 
consumption and growth if the government spending is worth the costs. In the case of European transition 
economies, we now expect little utility from Warsaw Pact military spending and continued soft-budget 
constraints that prop up failing state owned enterprises. Productive infrastructure investment is in the 
investment term. This implies it has to meet the same rate of return requirement as private investment 
expenditures.   
39 Inserting the producer decision rules for hiring capital and labor into the budget constraint yields a new 
expression for the growth path of capital:  
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change. All of these uses must be accommodated before income can contribute to growth in 
capital per worker and thus improvements in living standards. 
Although we caution interpretation of government in this model,
40 two fiscal policies 
reduce the steady state values of consumption and capital, (cht*, kht*). First, the marginal product 
of capital is higher because it equals (ρ+δ+η)/(1-zα).  As long as tax rate z is positive the gross 
marginal product must be greater and consequently the steady state quantity of capital, k*, lower. 
That is, capital taxes distort the private economy away from capital formation. 
  Steady state consumption is 
 (20)  cht* = yht* - [ght* +  (γ + η + δ)kht*] . 
The level c* at each k* is lower by the size of government - namely its spending level in the sense 
of its use of GDP. Since k* itself is lower, output is lower, thus c* is even smaller. We re-
emphasize here that this does not imply that all government spending is bad. In fact from an 
econometric viewpoint it makes sense to think of infrastructure investment as part of the 
investment term and of government consumption goods as part of consumption. Government in 
our model consists of expenditures that are no longer necessary in a private market economy. 
This would include Warsaw Pact military expenditures and subsidies to prop up inefficient state 
owned enterprises and so forth.  The main point is that government spending has a social cost that 
must be balanced against potential gains from its expenditures. Table 3 summarizes the steady 
state conditions. 
Budget deficits 
In the analysis so far we only modeled balanced budget policy. The effects of deficit spending in 
growth models on private sector decisions vary with the specification. In some cases deficits have 
no effects beyond those associated with the level of government activity itself. This is because in 
order to guarantee stability, constraints must be imposed on borrowing over the long run. This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 k •t = yht – {[z(r+δ)/(1-z)]kht + τht + cht + (γ+η+δ)kht} = yht – [ght + cht + (γ+η+δ)kht]. 
40 See footnote 387 and the next paragraph of the text.   
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means that deficits are eventually cancelled out by surpluses – which means that the choice of 
taxing in the current period or running deficits has no effect on output—a case of Ricardian 
Equivalence.
41 
If arbitrary constraints were not imposed on long-run government borrowing, then gov-
ernments would be able to postpone taxing to finance past deficits indefinitely, creating a Ponzi 
scheme outcome. Clearly such Ponzi schemes may well explain the behavior of state enterprise 
and financial officers in the endgame preceding the collapse of the Soviet system. 
Table 3. - Steady state conditions 
   __________________________________________________ 
The Euler condition 
 
  c •ht/cht = σ[(ρ + γ + δ + η) – (1-zα)yk] 
 
The modified golden rule 
 
∂yht/∂kht ≡ yk = (ρ + γ + η + δ)/(1-zα) 
 
   The dynamic path of capital 
 
k•ht = yht – [ght + cht + (γ + η + δ)kht] 
 
   Steady state consumption 
 
ch* = yh* - [ght + (γ + δ + η)kht*] 
  __________________________________________________ 
 
Reforms 3 and 4: Macroeconomic stabilization and industrial restructuring 
We can now link two additional reforms to growth. First, consider macroeconomic stabilization. 
If reform consists of shrinking wasteful government spending, then we model this by a reduction 
in g. A lower value for g implies more private consumption at each steady state level of income. 
In the context of Central Europe, this reform reflects reductions in two types of government 
spending:  Warsaw Pact spending on the military, and inefficient subsidies for state owned enter-
prises that could be better run by private owners. 
                                                            
41 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for derivations of the deficit case and an excellent discussion of the 
results.  
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Centralized governments had also established enormous systems of transfers creating 
various classes of wards of the state such as veterans, retired workers, ill citizens and so on. 
Recall that transfers in the model are just negative head taxes, q = -x. From a modeling 
perspective, reducing q has the effect of reducing taxes on some people and reducing benefits for 
others. While harmless in the aggregate model, this is an important result to each individual, 
because it suggests why some persons would endorse such a reform and some would not. This 
ambiguity reflects the ubiquitous welfare state debate over entitlements. 
The government model includes a tax on capital income at rate z that distorts the econ-
omy away from capital formation and growth. In the model, this means that the after-tax earnings 
by the private sector fall and less capital is accumulated. We use this parameter as the one 
through which industry restructuring (deregulation) operates on the steady state. In many 
transition economies, nominal privatization has been easier than reducing burdensome 
government regulations on industry. Wage controls, restrictive hiring and firing practices, and 
confusing tax rules may combine with inadequate enforcement institutions for private property 
rights to impede effective privatization. Thus reducing inefficient government regulations on 
private enterprise acts like an increase in the after-tax rate of return on capital. Less regulation 
lowers z, the effective "tax and regulatory" burden imposed by government. 
3. Endogenous technological change and technology transfer 
The endogenous technological change model builds on the Harrod neutral technological change 
with human capital model developed in section 1. Endogenous models are based on several key 
insights. The first is that new technologies, rather than falling like manna from heaven, may be 
costly to produce, i.e., the development of new technology requires inputs that cannot be used to 
produce corn. Suppose a share of the labor force produces new " ideas," so that 
(21) Nt = Nyt + NAt and sA ≡ NA/N, 
where Nyt is labor-producing final product (corn), and where NAt is labor-producing research (or 
ideas). The second insight is that ideas have unique characteristics that force us to treat them as  
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public goods - they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. Once a new idea is discovered additional 
people can consume it without cost, and these additional users cannot be easily excluded from 
consumption of the idea once it is discovered. Put together this means that we assume that new 
ideas have initial setup costs in discovery, but are then free to reproduce and easy to disseminate. 
These features mean that technology of production in the ideas-producing sector is characterized 
by increasing returns to scale.
42 Increasing returns requires a non-competitive sector in order to 
achieve efficient allocation of new ideas. We will assume that government issues patents to 
researchers who discover new varieties of seed corn. 
  Assume that new varieties add to the supply of capital available for production. Suppose 
the stock of capital is the sum of A-types of seed corn, so that 
  (22) K = j=1∑
j=Axj. 
This formulation is awkward because the quantity of capital simply grows as new technology is 
brought on line.
43 Because research is noncompetitive, we need to model the demand side for new 
varieties of corn. Suppose we let the demand for each variety be the same, then K = xA. Under 
these assumptions the derivation of the steady state can be easily produced. 
  If we start with the human capital production function, then 
(23) Yt = F(Kt,Ht) = Kt
α(e
ϕµAtNt)












The advantage of endogenous over exogenous models is that one can model the causes of At. 
Recall that Ht ≡ e
ϕµAtNt; human capital is the number of effective units of human capital 
measured in efficiency units. We maintain the assumption that e
ϕµ reflects additions to effective 
                                                            
42 The research sector in the corn economy uses genetics to produce new types of corn stalks that produce 
more corn per seed unit. 
43 Jones (1998) provides a lucid analysis of this model.  
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human capital from education and training, and we maintain the assumption of constant 
geometric growth of labor η. 
  Before we model At we show that the solution system for final product is of the same 
form as the Solow model with exogenous technological change and human capital. Now, how-
ever, we require a fraction of the labor force to be tied up in research. Only a fraction of workers 
are engaged in production of final product, corn; and thus, we define the proportion of workers in 
the competitive final output sector in efficiency units of effective human capital: 
(24) Hyt  ≡ e
ϕµAtNt = e
ϕµAt(1-sA)N t. 
  From the point of view of modeling production in the final goods sector, the setup is ex-
actly the same as the previous model, except that we will measure output and capital in efficiency 
units of effective human capital working in the final product sector. Defining yτt ≡ Yt/Hyt and kτt ≡ 
Kt/Ht, the new solution system with constant savings rate is 
(25) kτt* = [s/(γ+η+)]
1/(1α)  and   yτt* = kτt*
α  
yt* = yτt*e
ϕµ(1-sA)A t.  
  We now model technological change. This research originates with Romer (1986). Much 
of this modeling has been controversial, because some of these models suggest some rapid 
growth of output at the steady state resulting from increments of the labor force doing research. 
Jones develops a model that includes Romer's insights but avoids some of the problematic 
conclusions. The rate of change of new technology depends on two variables, the number of 
workers in the research sector, NA, and the existing stock of technology (i.e., the number of ideas 
already discovered or simply the state of knowledge), At: 




φ is the rate of discovery with φ representing the effect on the rate of discovery of the state of 
knowledge; ε is the researcher elasticity of discoveries. Jones discusses these parameters for ad- 
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vanced societies in which new research and development is taking place. He argues that 0<ε<1, 
where values less than one mean that researchers are less productive at the margin.  
 Values  of  φ depend upon one's view of the implications for research of existing 
knowledge. Romer had implicitly assumed φ=1. A case can be made for φ<0 – the early 
researcher fishes out the biggest ideas first and only smaller ones remain to be discovered later. If 
φ>0 then the idea is that today's researchers “stand on the shoulders of giants.” Today's 
researchers produce more varieties per unit of labor input than their predecessors did, because 
their predecessors laid the groundwork. If φ<1, we can divide (26) by At, so that the left-hand side 
is the growth rate of discoveries. If discoveries occur at the constant geometric rate y, then the 
left-hand side of (26) over A is the constant rate γ, and we have 
(26') A•t/At = θA
φ-1N
ε = γ. 
Taking natural log derivatives of (A.26'), we have 
0 = ε(N•t/Nt) - (l-φ) (A•t/At) = εη - (1-φ)γ.  
The rate of technological change, should it reach a constant rate, is 
(27) γ = εη/(1-φ). 
Thus, the rate of technical change, in this model, depends on the growth of the labor force, η, 
(assuming a fixed proportion do research), the effect on the discovery rate of new researchers, ε, 
and the effect on discoveries of the state of knowledge, φ.  
  We can also solve (26') for At: 





Replacing At in the (25) solution for the steady state income per person (living standards) with 
(28) yields 




Equation (25') tells us that steady state per capita growth (which is, in effect, living standards) 
reflects three types of forces. First, yτt*, from equation (25), says that higher savings rates will  
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mean a higher level of income, but rapid population growth and shoddy construction will vitiate 
this effect. We have been developing these forces throughout the modeling process; a high rate of 
accumulation of quality capital relative to population growth implies higher living standards. The 
development of consumer behavior in equation (10’) introduced ρ and σ, two parameters through 
which reforms that benefit consumers are channeled.  
The second set of forces in equation (25') involves the level of human capital in the 
society that is working in the final product sector, e
ϕµ(1-SA). This includes education and skill de-
velopment and the implementation of that education on producing output. The third set of forces, 
θ[sANt]
εAt
φ/γ, reflects the underlying causes of technological change. In this model, the level of 
technology depends on the proportion of workers involved in research, [sANt]
ε, and the extent to 
which incremental researchers influence the discovery rate. The growth rate of technology rises 
with both N and A; however, their effects depend upon unknown parameters, θ and φ. These pa-
rameters reflect the nature of the research process, the evolution of discovery, and its effective 
impact on output. 
In order to illustrate the model's contribution to understanding growth in transition 
economies, we now model how technology may be transferred to transition economies from the 
advanced countries like Germany, the US and Japan. 
4. Technology transfer 
We attribute pure technological change to advanced societies only and treat the growth rate of 
technology in these advanced countries as exogenous to emerging economies. We begin with the 
model in which magnitudes were measured in efficiency units of labor, but we replace At with Lt, 
which represents the learning level of workers in transition economies at adopting new technolo-
gies. Thus, we define Et = LtNt, so the production function is 




1-α.   
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  We now define the stock of capital for a transition economy as the sum of the number of 
strains of technologically different corn that can be used in production by the workers in this 
economy. The equation for the stock of capital will be similar to (22). The number of strains will 
depend upon how much the workers have learned, L, up to the level of the most advanced world 
technology from industrial countries, A: 
(30) K = j=1∑
j=Lxj = Lx. 
The second equality follows from the same reasoning as in the endogenous technology models. It 
also follows that yt* = yt*Et. Now we define the learning process in the transition economy, just 
as we had defined the evolution of technological change in advanced economies in earlier 
models: 




Directly from the earlier models, we now have 
(32) yt* = yet*Ht* = yet*κe
ϕµ(At/Lt)
γNt. 
Equation (32) differs from equation (25'). For a transition economy, we have integrated domestic 
learning (skill and education development) and the accumulation of new capital as a result of 
technological change. The idea behind this model is that as a transition economy's work force 
learns more about new technologies, workers can employ more advanced technologies via capital. 
However, because L enters in the denominator of the right-hand side of (32), as L→A increments 
to L become less able to advance income per capita. This means that it is simply harder to 
accumulate knowledge as one gets closer to the frontier of knowledge. Recall that L is the level of 
knowledge in the developing (emerging) economy and A is the level at the world frontier. 
Reform 5: Trade liberalization 
  The key new parameter in equation (32) is κ. This is the parameter through which 
advanced world technology is transferred from developed economies to emerging economies. 
One can think of к as the elasticity of human capital in an emerging society as a result of adoption  
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of new technologies from advanced societies. Income is increased because domestic human capi-
tal in the emerging society rises. Since these new technologies are transferred from developed 
economies, we assume they do so through the degree of free trade between the emerging econ-
omy in question and advanced economies of the world. 
  We see this new parameter κ as the vehicle through which the free trade reform influ-
ences the steady state. The argument is that a consequence of free trade is that domestic industries 
are forced to compete on open markets. Another consequence is that multinational corporations 
with new technologies enter the emerging economy. These new firms bring with them new ideas. 
The domestic firms, in order to compete on international markets, also adopt new (cost saving) 
technologies. These advances in technology in emerging markets occur only if free trade is 
allowed between the emerging and advanced economies. Thus, free trade increases κ. We would 
expect free trade to alter other aspects of the steady state as well. For instance, free trade lowers 
costs and improves the mix of consumer goods. It also improves, via comparative advantage, the 
quality of capital and thus lowers depreciation.
44 
                                                            
44 This conclusion does not contradict the notion that the mix of capital may eventually morph into faster 
depreciating assets, like computers instead of abacuses. But for a given asset type, comparative advantage 
indicates that broader trading zones allow more specialization, and improved product quality should be a 
byproduct. 
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